WWII: Opp. Barbarossa

[moving_bush]

I did a search on WW II but found nothing. I want to start this thread in order to have general discussions on the subject.

[Hagrid442]

Ok. But give us an idea of what you want discussed. It's a huge topic.

[moving_bush]

sorry. how about opp. barbroussa

[Jagdverband]

Operation Barbarossa..... the German invasion of Russia. Most discussions center around whether it was the biggest mistake of military history. I personally disagree. I have a nice long diatribe I submitted as a history assignment for a 2nd year university class which focuses on the point that Germany's mistakes in WW2 lay not in commencement or abandonment of campaigns, though there are some critical screw-ups in that area, but rather in the area of overall preparation for war. I cannot recall a single occasion in history in which an armed force went to war more poorly prepared for the conditions it would face than the Wehrmacht in 1939.

[ANDTORR]

Allright, first off I'm new here so please excuse any mistakes I may make. Second I am a history buff, and I do belive that the invasion of the USSR by Germany, at that point in the war, was the bigest mistake made in military history. If Hitler had not attacked russia then he would have had WAY more resouses to throw at England, AND if England had fallen then he would have had more resourses to use against USSR, and in the Sahara. Also the fact that bombing, commando, and naval raids were all launched from england. Also if England had fallen then most of the supplie lines would be cut off for North Africa, and then that front would be finished aswell, allowing hitler to concentrate ALL of his military resouses on the USSR. You also have to remember the sheer ammount of resouses that hitler was putting into submarine production to keep England from being properly supplied, once England fell then he could have used much more of those resourses for building tanks and other land or air based equipment. But I do have to agree with Jagdverband in that the german army was verry poorly prepared for the Russian winter.

Basicly the allies won the war because Hitler tried to do to much, to fast.

[Wab]

There's a lot of conmjecture that the problems of Barbarossa lay not in the plan or the execution.

SOurces I've read say that Barbarossa was part of a grand Axis plan to capture the great oil resources of the Caucasus, North Africa and Burma and in doing so surrounding the Middle East fields.

According to these sources the idea behind the Russian invasion was to swing south and capture the oil fields before moving onto Russian cities.

But the generals put in charge weren't versed in the concept of Blitzkreig and instead attacked the cities bogging the army down.

[Hagrid442]

People fail to realize that Barbarossa was immensely successful. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were surrounded and taken prisoner, and the Wehrmacht was able to reach as far as the gates of Moscow.

This operation started on June 22, 1941. That means, it started relatively late in the year. What if it had started a month earlier? Then Moscow would have been captured most likely. Why didn't it start earlier, then? Hitler got involved in invading Greece, a campaign that took way longer than he expected since resistance was stiff.

[Jagdverband]

There were twelve weeks of delay prior to the attack on Moscow, which jumped off in late November 1941, about a week before the first winter storms. The three army groups assigned to Barbarossa needed time to rest and re-equip following the initial invasion, but twelve weeks was far too long. That comes down to one person - Adolf Hitler. The idea of attacking towards cities (especially Moscow) was sound strategy for the sole reason that the only thing propping up the Red Army in 1941 was fear of the NKVD and Josef Stalin. Stalin never permitted the evacuation of Moscow, even when the German Army came knocking on the front gate, and tried kicking in the back gate. Had Moscow fallen, and the Politburo with it, things might have gone a lot differently, and those months of delay prior to the final attack on Moscow could have proved beneficial for Germany.

Regarding poor supply situations, I determined during research for the paper I mentioned above that the OKH (German Army High Command) had realised as early as early August 1941 that Operation Barbarossa would run behind schedule, and supplies for winter operations were stockpiled in forward areas. The problem was one of transport from those forward depots to the front lines. A year earlier, the Wehrmacht had been able to transport 20000 tons of supplies at corps level per day to support 101 divisions in the field for the invasion of France and western Europe. There were negligible increases in that corps level transport capability by 1941, and there were at least 50% more troops assigned to Barbarossa than the western push. Ergo, there was ample supplies to fight in the Russian winter, the problem was those supplies were not at the front in sufficient quantities to make a difference.

Regarding war with England, remember that Hitler didn't declare war on Great Britain - Great Britain declared war on Germany. The Brits forced Hitler's hand in that sense. There is some debate over whether Hitler wanted to fight the British at all, but that is a debate for another post. There are a few other things that bear mentioning, but I'll leave those for another time.

[ANDTORR]

People fail to realize that Barbarossa was immensely successful. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were surrounded and taken prisoner, and the Wehrmacht was able to reach as far as the gates of Moscow.

This operation started on June 22, 1941. That means, it started relatively late in the year. What if it had started a month earlier? Then Moscow would have been captured most likely. Why didn't it start earlier, then? Hitler got involved in invading Greece, a campaign that took way longer than he expected since resistance was stiff.
how can you say it was imensly successfully? it lost germany the war! sure the germans killed or captured more russians than they lost troops but that doesnt mean that it was a successs! thats like saying the americans won the vietnam war! eerrr excuse me "policing action". but no I still think that opp. barbarosa lost german the war, because it was launched at the time that it was launched at. for the reasons I stated above

[moving_bush]

What r u talking about America did win the Vietnam war (LOL!!!!!!!!!) but barbroussa was unsuccessful because of the same reasons that napoleons army was unsuccessful. The harsh Russian winters and lack of supplies.

[ANDTORR]

What r u talking about America did win the Vietnam war (LOL!!!!!!!!!) but barbroussa was unsuccessful because of the same reasons that napoleons army was unsuccessful. The harsh Russian winters and lack of supplies.
the winter did play a large part in the germans defeat but it was also the sheer russian numbers that defeated the germans, also the EXTREAM improvement in russian tank divisions from the begining of the war to the end, and the germans lack of supplies as well

[moving_bush]

That’s correct the tank did have a direct influence on the victory. But also the Germans thought that they were going to take Russia that they only supplied the army enough goods to last only a short few months. By the end of the war the Germans were in such need of supplies that they were begging Hitler to let them surrender.

[ANDTORR]

I said supplies..... :whistle:

[moving_bush]

sorry i misread your reply

[Jagdverband]

That’s correct the tank did have a direct influence on the victory. But also the Germans thought that they were going to take Russia that they only supplied the army enough goods to last only a short few months. By the end of the war the Germans were in such need of supplies that they were begging Hitler to let them surrender.

Um, no. From my research paper that I referred to above......

Much has been written about the supply difficulties experienced by the
armies invading Russia in 1941. A common feature of Germany’s early
campaigns is that they were all launched in the spring or summer of the
year in question. Although Operation Barbarossa progressed rapidly in the
early stages, it soon became apparent to the General Staff that the invasion
of Russia would take longer than previously expected. Preparations for
winter operations began as early as August 1941, with stockpiles of cold
weather lubricants, uniforms and other necessities being prepared. Due to
the overextended front lines, combined with the limitations of the
available road and rail transportation, these stockpiles did not reach the
front in sufficient quantities to advance the war effort in Germany’s
favour. These factors combined to cripple the advance on Moscow in
November 1941 when the winter cold froze up everything from weapons
to vehicle engines [van Cleveld: pp173-4].

The source is Martin van Cleveld's Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, published in 1978. Other research will reveal that prior to WW2, Germany was still very much a non-mechanised nation. Domestic wealth in terms of coal and iron allowed for vast and rapid development of railways, a fact true to much of western Europe. A near total lack of domestic oil resources prevented any substantial move to advance the automotive industry in Germany. In fact, one of the boom industries in 1930s Germany was synthetic oil production, but that was unable to keep up with the demands a society on the road to a strong economic recovery. Hence, Germany sought to maintain good economic ties with nations in Europe that did have domestic oil resources, such as Rumania.

Now, in a nation that had good reliable railway networks, there existed the possibility to transport vast quantities of goods for minimal expenditure as a proportion to the profit gained by the shipment. The weakness there was the limitation of fixed locations. Railheads have to be close to where you want the material delivered or transported from. There then exists the problem of moving that material to the end consumer. Germany's weak automotive industry could not supply the means to transport all the goods that needed transporting. Now, apply that to a wartime situation. Wars, especially after 1918, are generally not fought close to railheads, meaning Germany's capability to wage mobile warfare was limited at best. Keep in mind that Germany in 1940 possessed enough transport capability to move less than 20,000 tons of supplies per day to support 103 divisions in the field, and those figures got worse as the war progressed. The Allied armies in 1944 could move 69,000 tons per day to support 47 divisions in the field. That's a 7.5 to 1 advantage on the same battlefields.

As for supplies, please, don't make me laugh. The average German landser may have starved and froze as the war dragged on, but at no time did armaments production drop off. In fact, after Todt was replaced by Albert Speer as Minister for Armaments and Industry, German industrial production significantly increased, to the point where his input resulted in the war lasting at least 12 months longer than it would otherwise have. At no point did Germany ever run short of the weapons required to fight the war. But in the opposite sense, Germany lost the war before it even started, because the Reich could not transport the men it needed to fight, or the supplies they needed to fight with.